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Close business relationships are important in the food industry. However, the introduction of
electronic commerce has emerged as a fundamental challenge to these relationships. In partic-
ular, retailers who start procuring private label food products in electronic auctions risk the ter-
mination of the relationships with their suppliers thus losing the value derived from these
relationships. Instead, they move their focal interest towards single, unrelated transactions. The
authors argue that this development increases the optimal amount of fraud in electronic com-
merce. In this context, they analyze the occurrence of opportunism.
Keywords: Relationships, information asymmetry, auctions, opportunism, economics of infor-
mation
1 The Occurrence of Opportunism in Electronic Markets
With the advent of the Internet, researchers and practitioners alike had great expectations and
praised the Internet for nearly unlimited purposes. For many business applications, the Internet
seemed to be ’all-gifted’, just like the all-gifted Pandora, the first woman on earth in Greek
Mythology. But, early appraisals changed. Pandora opened the box with all misfortunes of
mankind. Similarly, the Internet revealed its drawbacks. For example, Internet marketplaces
may promote fraud in comparison to traditional business networks, since long-term relation-
ships, personal commitment and trust between partners are less perceivable. This paper is
therefore going to examine the factors influencing the occurrence of opportunistic behavior in
retailers’ online reverse auctions to source private label (PL) food products. We derive expla-
nations from the New Institutional Economics framework.
The next section illustrates aims and consequences of using online reverse auctions to carry out
transactions between retailers and PL food product suppliers. In Section 3, we describe the
information asymmetry in those transactions from an Information Economics’ point of view.
We suspect growing information asymmetries when relationships are transferred to electronic
marketplaces. In Section 4, we extend the analytical approach by combining Information Eco-
nomics with Nooteboom’s (1996) opportunism model. Thereafter, we apply this model to394   Pandora’s Box: Does Electronic Commerce Increase the Optimal Amount of Fraud?
online reverse auctions and identify different factors influencing the occurrence of fraud.
Finally, we deduce implications for management practice.
2 Business Auctions for the Procurement of Private Label Food Products
More than six years ago, worldwide retail companies started founding joint b-to-b-market-
places such as Global Net Xchange (GNX) and Worldwide Retail Exchange (WWRE). In 2000
those retailers started contracting their suppliers by using reverse auctions on the Internet. In
addition to the design of an auction, e. g., the form, price acceptance, pricing design, lot
design, and auction duration (Daly/Nath 2005; Jap 2002), researchers have discussed several
opportunities and threats of business auctions on the Internet. An extensive analysis of articles
published from 2000 to 2005 in Lebensmittel Zeitung, Germany’s leading food-retailing jour-
nal, revealed four important effects of online reverse auctions for retailers. (1) Global sourc-
ing: Retail companies intend to find new suppliers for food products and non-food items via
the Internet. However, this involves uncertainty as the new suppliers and their products need to
be assessed. Some retailers ask for samples in order to invite only those suppliers to a closed
auction whose samples meet the retailer’s quality expectations. Other retailers ask suppliers to
bid for a tender first. Only after the auction is completed they start auditing those suppliers
with the best bids. These suppliers need to meet the quality expectation, otherwise they are not
contracted. (2) Procurement processes: Auctions make procurement processes more efficient
by saving time for negotiations thus speeding up the whole process. Reductions of up to 80%
in process runtime and 60-70% in process costs have been reported. However, at the same time
legal uncertainty is mentioned. It is difficult to compensate this uncertainty with trust between
the involved parties (similar to Jap 2002). Moreover, suppliers and responsible buying agents
in retail companies alike complain about deteriorated relationships. Furthermore, a lack of data
and process quality occurs although trainings for auction participants are offered. (3) Market
transparency: Markets become more transparent for retailers because they are able to easily
address more suppliers as well as to survey and record the suppliers’ bidding behavior. How-
ever, the retailers still need to know the market very well prior to the auction (similar to Jap
2002). (4) Price Reductions: Due to increased market transparency, competition has intensi-
fied which results in the decline of product prices. Especially the first auctions taking place in
a specific product group have resulted in significant price reductions. Reductions between 3
and 35% have been reported. To realize such reductions retailers need to possess a comprehen-
sive knowledge of the respective market. First, they need to carefully select the products and to
provide detailed product specifications. Second, orders must be of high value. In order to
achieve such values, retail companies across Europe pool their demand for PL products to con-
duct only one single auction (Collaborative Sourcing). Third, competition should be intensive
and spare capacities should be available in the supply base (similar to Jap 2002).
As a consequence, auctions for sourcing PL food and non-food products have become very
popular. The fast growing PL food business particularly focuses on price and cost reductions in
order to cope with the price differentials. For example, differentials amount to 18% for refrig-
erated food and 42% for pet food compared with manufactured brands. Today, PL products
account for approximately 17% of the global market share in value, with an even higher
amount of 23% in Europe. The leading food related product category is refrigerated food,Michael Welling et al.   395
where already 32% of all sales are PL sales, followed by frozen food (25%), and pet food
(21%). The relevance of PL products continued to grow in 2005 and market insider reveal that
the trend will further strengthen in upcoming years (AC Nielsen 2005).
Turning our attention from retailers to suppliers, similar opportunities and threats of auctions
have to be considered: (1) Global sourcing: Incumbent suppliers that have been in a close
business relationship with a retailer realize new competitors in the market. For out-suppliers,
i. e. suppliers that have not been in a relationship with this retailer before, global sourcing
offers the opportunity to address new retailers. In an auction the price is the most important
decision criterion so that out-suppliers do not have to fear any disadvantages in bidding for the
contract. (2) Procurement processes: Suppliers also profit from efficiency gains in selling
processes. But apart from this, they face various kinds of uncertainty. Deteriorated relation-
ships lead to a lack of trust. First, for suppliers the retailers’ procurement processes are not
transparent although some retail companies explicitly guarantee that all suppliers receive the
same information before and during the auction. Second, suppliers report of changing specifi-
cations. Retail companies change conditions after a supplier has already won the auction so
that the supplier’s calculation based on the first specification becomes obsolete. Third, suppli-
ers are afraid of fake bids that only aim to further decrease prices. (3) Market transparency:
While incumbent suppliers might lose transactions, out-suppliers have the chance to win a bid
if only the price is decisive. (4) Price reductions: The price is the most important decision cri-
terion. Hence, for suppliers it is almost impossible to compete with superior quality of their
products.
In the following sections we focus on online auctions in which the identity of the bidders is not
disclosed. We use a New Institutional Economics point of view to identify factors influencing
the likelihood of opportunism in electronic marketplaces in comparison to traditional transac-
tions.
3 Buyer-Seller Information Asymmetry from an Information Economics Perspective
Based on Stigler’s (1961) idea of ‘search costs’, Nelson (1970) and Darby/Karni (1973) sug-
gested the distinction between search, experience, and credence qualities of goods. Despite the
popularity of this concept in economic theory and management practice, there remains confu-
sion on how to distinguish between those qualities. The distinction can be based on the points
in time, when a consumer can judge the quality of a product. In accordance with the original
approach of Nelson, the distinction can also be based on the points in time, when a consumer is
really judging the quality (Welling 2006). Although being able to judge the quality of a good, a
consumer may abstain from doing so due to high inspection costs. Based on widely used infor-
mation economic models in literature, we refer to Nelson-Situations (Nelson 1970), if the qual-
ities can be observed by inspection during the search process prior to purchase. In contrast, we
refer to Akerlof-Situations (Akerlof 1970), if inspection is only possible after purchase. Finally,
we call those cases Arrow-Situations (Arrow 1963) in which goods can neither be inspected
before nor at any time after the purchase. Depending on a cost-benefit analysis in different
buying situations, economic agents will – if possible – try to either inspect these factual quali-
ties before the purchase, or delay the inspection to a point in time after the purchase, or will
never inspect the qualities at all. In other words: Depending on the situation, factual search396   Pandora’s Box: Does Electronic Commerce Increase the Optimal Amount of Fraud?
and/or experience qualities which can be judged may become calculus expericence and/or cre-
dence qualities by the actor’s deliberate choice. Accordingly, these situations will lead to dif-
ferent information problems: In Nelson-Situations, a potential customer can verify the
supplier’s information on a good’s qualities before making the decision. Opportunistic behav-
ior like the presentation of false or misleading information can be discovered since the quali-
ties can be observed prior to purchase. Therefore, suppliers cannot expect to gain an advantage
by providing false information. Since in Akerlof-Situations qualities cannot be discovered
until the product is purchased or used after purchase, a potential customer cannot verify infor-
mation on those qualities of a certain product prior to purchase. This information disadvantage
of potential customers in comparison to the better-informed suppliers is called ‘information
asymmetry’. In these cases, customers have to be aware of opportunistic supplier behavior like
the provision of misleading information or the delivery of poor product quality. But due to the
information asymmetry it is difficult to reveal fraudulent behavior. Thus, according to the eco-
nomic analysis of Darby/Karni (1973), the optimal amount of fraud increases with a rising
degree of information asymmetry.
On the Internet a huge amount of information is available. Nevertheless, fraudulent transac-
tions are frequently reported. The way of presenting information and products on the Internet
gives reasons for this observation. On the Internet, a product is described by information, while
this information is separated from the product itself. Although this does not change the charac-
teristics of a product itself, the process of verification of the product qualities becomes more
difficult or even impossible. A higher information asymmetry is the result leading to a higher
optimal amount of fraud. This is due to two factors: (1) The opportunity to inspect the qualities
has been changed as the presentation of products on the Internet is limited to audio-visual illus-
trations. Thus, other senses cannot be addressed and verifications of product qualities through
‘smelling’, ‘feeling’, and ‘tasting’ are infeasible. Even visual characteristics like the size and
color of a product are more difficult or even impossible to evaluate. Regarding those product
characteristics, the situation has been transformed into an Akerlof-Situation. In this respect
former (factual) search qualities turn into (factual) experience or even into (factual) credence
qualities (Graefe 2003; Welling 2006). Even if agents aim at evaluating those qualities they are
factually not able to do so. (2) The inspection costs increase when procuring via the Internet.
Even if consumers are actually able to inspect goods or production facilities, the inspection
costs will probably be higher. For example, travel costs have to be taken into account in the
case of global sourcing, making it economically senseless to judge the qualities prior to pur-
chase. Even if information on the product qualities is available on the Internet, the customers
are often unable to verify this information. Therefore, we can expect to find goods with a high
share of factual and calcalus experience qualities on the Internet. Suppliers, especially those
with inferior products, will therefore try to take advantage of those two effects and strive for
profits, for instance, by presenting false information.Michael Welling et al.   397
4 Fraudulent Transactions in Retailer-Supplier Relationships – Playing Pandora?
4.1 Preconditions for Fraudulent Transactions
Darbi/Karni’s analysis on the optimal amount of fraud is solely based on different levels of
information asymmetry. Nevertheless, they fit with a wider but closely related research con-
text: In the New Institutional Economics framework, researchers have discussed the determi-
nants of opportunistic behavior in transactions in general. The following section is largely
based on a model by Nooteboom (1996). However, some adjustments concerning the alloca-
tion of certain sub-factors to the three identified main variables ‘incentive for opportunism’,
‘opportunities for opportunism’, and ‘propensity towards opportunism’ affecting the level of a
supplier S’s fraud against his/her retailer R have been made.
‘Incentive for opportunism’ – the first determinant in Nooteboom’s model – has a positive
influence on the level of opportunistic behavior. It reflects the monetary net benefit the sup-
plier S might realize through opportunistic behavior (Nooteboom 1996; Böhme 1999). It can
be subdivided into the benefits of an act of opportunism and its costs. Overall, this incentive is
especially influenced by the degree of information asymmetry between the transaction part-
ners. Taking into account the benefits of opportunism, the incentive is positively influenced by
the value from the fraudulent transaction for S, but also by R’s dependence on S. This level of
dependence is a result of R’s switching costs due to his/her specific investments (Williamson
1985; Böhme 1999). Besides, R’s dependence is also affected by the future value of S relative
to the next best alternative supplier (Nooteboom 1996; Nooteboom et al. 1997; Böhme 1999).
As counterbalancing factors the costs of fraud have to be considered exerting a negative effect
on S’s incentive for opportunism. Therefore, we have to take the supplier’s own level of depen-
dence into account as well. This, in turn, is influenced by S’s stake in specific assets or his/her
switching costs, respectively and R’s future value to S which might be lost if R due to fraudu-
lent behavior by S breaks up the relationship or cuts back in business. This is one potential
forming of the reputation effect where the shadow of the future with respect to the existing
relationship becomes relevant for S’s current decision to behave opportunistically. Here, repu-
tation is seen as private information, being effective only in the dyadic relation (Shapiro
1983a). Another part of this reputation effect pertains to future sales with other (possibly new)
retailers who might back down from dealings with S due to his/her bad reputation which is
assumed to be public information (Klein/Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983b). Taken together, these
‘private ordering’ (Williamson 1985) compensating factors might be interpreted as hostages,
pledges or guarantees in the hands of R that he/she might use as ex post sanctions to opportu-
nistic conduct by S (Williamson 1983). In addition, there might also be formal, legally enforce-
able forms of monetary sanctions, such as contractual penalties or damages. This ‘legal
ordering’ also has a negative effect on S’s incentive for fraud. It depends on the level of detail
of the contract, the size of the potential sanction, the sudden occurrence of novel, unforeseen
and hence not (yet) contractually covered techniques for opportunistic behavior as well as pos-
sible changes of the formal institutional framework governing the relationship. But in order for
the threat of private and legal sanctions to pose restrictions on S’s opportunism, fraudulent
conduct has to be detected (Nooteboom et al. 1997). Thus, the existing methods of controlling398   Pandora’s Box: Does Electronic Commerce Increase the Optimal Amount of Fraud?
and monitoring S to reduce information asymmetries plus R’s actual usage of these methods
for monitoring his/her supplier also have an influence on S’s incentive for opportunism.
‘Opportunities for opportunism’ is the second antecedent of opportunistic behavior. It refers
to the feasibility of an opportunistic act to be conducted by S. This includes the supplier’s abil-
ities to even discover existing monetarily profitable options for cheating as well as his/her
competencies to utilize these opportunities (Nooteboom 1996). A factor positively influencing
a person’s competence to behave opportunistically might be his/her level of entrepreneurial
alertness as discussed by Kirzner (1978). The determinants discussed so far present traditional
Transaction Cost Economics description of the human nature as generally being opportunism
prone. It holds that opportunism will emerge to the fullest possible extent as long as it yields a
profit and one is not prevented from doing so. This negative view of economic agents was
object of various forms of critique (e. g. Ghoshal/Moran 1996). According to Granovetter
(1985), exchange relations are typically embedded in a surrounding social context which
serves as an adjustment factor for opportunism. However, “a rejection of the TCE view as a
whole … runs the risk of throwing away the baby with the bathwater” (Nooteboom 1996).
Although not ubiquitous, opportunism is nonetheless an observable fact in a lot of real
exchange relations.
To account for these circumstances, Nooteboom explicitly includes the actor’s ‘propensity
towards opportunism’ as the third main determinant of opportunistic behavior (Nooteboom
1996; see also Ghoshal/Moran 1996; Böhme 1999). This factor extends the Transaction Cost
Economics point of view with aspects from sociology. It refers to the supplier’s proclivity to
actually employ known available and monetarily profitable opportunities for fraud. This incli-
nation is itself affected by several other factors: First of all, the level of trust, which has been
built up between the parties during the relationship, has a negative impact on the supplier’s
propensity towards fraud. Trust can be the result of either bonds of friendship and/or sympathy
between retailer and supplier due to, e. g., personal forms of communication (leading to a low
degree of social distance between R and S, Böhme 1999) or of jointly developed norms and
institutions (Nooteboom et al. 1997). To the extent that a high degree of trust between the par-
ties prevails, the resulting low propensity towards opportunism may exercise a regulative
effect for S so that ultimately a feasible chance for fraud is rejected despite of its monetary net
benefit. However, next to trust, S’s inclination towards fraud is also positively affected by the
pressure from competition S faces (Nooteboom 1996; Böhme 1999). As long as the industry S
is part of is characterized by high rates of growth and a low pressure from competition it might
not be necessary for S to exploit every existing opportunity for monetary profit. Yet, this might
change as competitive pressure rises thus leading to severe consequences for S of even the ter-
mination of business if he/she passes up such a chance for fraud. In these cases, the negative
influence of built-up trust on the supplier’s propensity towards opportunism might be over-
compensated by a positive effect from competitive pressure to actually employ known profit-
able chances for fraud.
To sum up, with this model focusing on ‘hard’ as well as on ‘soft’ influences, Nooteboom pre-
sents a fairly comprehensive attempt to list factors affecting the risk of fraud in business trans-
actions. Subsequently we are going to use this model to compare the likelihood of fraud inMichael Welling et al.   399
traditional procurement relations with the procurement processes in electronic marketplaces,
thereby focusing on the procurement of PL food products.
4.2 Procurement of Private Label Food Products on Electronic Marketplaces: Incentive,
Opportunities, and Propensity for Fraud Transactions
Nowadays, retailers increasingly purchase PL food products in online reverse auctions which
results in significant changes in the relationships between retailers and suppliers. Although
potential benefits are widely appreciated, this form of procurement also opens a big, but
unknown box containing potential disadvantages as, for example, suppliers’ opportunistic
behavior. However, the illumination of the factors influencing the outcome of ’evil’ is the first
step towards seeing and using ’hope’ on the bottom of the box.
Analyzing the supplier‘s incentive for opportunism in online reverse auctions in comparison
to the traditional transaction situation, we find that certain characteristics change the supplier’s
benefits and costs of opportunistic behavior. Especially the degree of information asymmetry
is higher. As described in section 3, this is partly a result of the different opportunities for a
retailer to judge the qualities of the product prior to purchase. Procurement on electronic mar-
ketplaces is characterized as an Akerlof- instead of the former Nelson-Situation. However,
even if the situation might still be termed Nelson-Situation as inspection is still possible,
inspection costs due to global sourcing and completely different technological setups may
become so high that the retailer abstains from it. Yet, the net effect on the supplier’s incentive
for fraud cannot be determined without ambiguity since the effects on the benefits and costs
might compensate for one another. On the one hand, a rising net value of fraud increases the
benefits of opportunism since the transaction costs to agree on a contract are lower on the
Internet. On the other hand, using electronic marketplaces abates the retailer’s dependency on
the supplier due to lower switching costs as well as S’s lower future value for R since suppliers
become interchangeable. With respect to the costs of fraud, being interchangeable also raises
the supplier’s incentive for opportunism since not only S’s future value for R, but also R’s
future value for S diminishes. Knowing about one’s own replaceability leads to a shorter plan-
ning perspective thus reducing the amount of future transactions that are considered. In other
words, the supplier’s reputation as a piece of private information between the partners does not
have as large an impact on the stabilization of the relationship because of a shorter shadow of
the future. Moreover, considering the technical possibilities on the Internet, the reputation
effects for possible transactions with other retailers are lower as well. This is due to the fact
that a negative reputation will hamper S’s fraudulent behavior only, if this bad reputation as a
consequence of detected opportunism becomes public information. Yet, on the Internet suppli-
ers might change their identity more easily after having conducted fraud. In further transac-
tions with the same or with alternative retailers, S might therefore not be identified as the
opportunistic agent in the market. In addition, the shorter planning range could also influence
S’s switching costs affecting his/her dependency negatively. Just like R, S will not dedicate
specific investments to a certain partner, if there is no guarantee for sustained transactions.
Hence, S faces lower switching costs respectively a higher incentive for fraud. Changes with
respect to legal ordering and its effect on the incentive for opportunism by S as a result of con-
ducting transactions on the Internet have to be considered as well. On the one hand, due to the400   Pandora’s Box: Does Electronic Commerce Increase the Optimal Amount of Fraud?
greater information asymmetry that accompanies transactions on electronic marketplaces, con-
tracts cannot be as detailed as for traditional transactions. Therefore, not incorporating all pos-
sible manifestations of fraud, the consequences of opportunistic behavior for S will be lower
resulting in a higher incentive. This effect is reinforced by the legal uncertainty of Internet
transactions which is reported even for dealings between domestic partners. Besides, since
suppliers might come from abroad, it is unclear which national laws will be applied which dis-
closes possibilities not to be punished for fraud. Another effect concerning S’s incentive for
opportunism might be deducted taking the methods of controlling and monitoring into account.
Since those methods might constantly be developed and improved by the retailer, especially
new suppliers cannot evaluate which methods will be applied. This uncertainty can result in a
lower incentive for opportunism. Yet, on the Internet the supplier has a higher possibility of
hiding former fraud transactions. Due to these possibilities of changing one’s virtual identity, a
history of opportunistic conduct is more difficult to detect than outside the electronic world.
In contrast to S’s incentive for opportunism being affected in either ways by procuring via
electronic marketplaces, the alterations of his/her propensity towards opportunism are clear-
cut: Due to the different exchange situation, the propensity rises leading in turn to a higher pos-
sibility of fraud by S: First, its price-based nature increases the intensity of competition.
Besides, the supplier’s perception of his/her competitive surroundings is sharpened compared
to the traditional relationship being usually based on long-term considerations. Therefore, S’s
perceived pressure from competition to exploit any existing and monetary profitable opportu-
nity for opportunism is higher. Second, the social distance between the transaction partners on
the Internet is increased as due to impersonal forms of communication bonds of friendship and
sympathy in an auction are hardly built up. This again leads to a higher propensity towards
fraud. Finally, whereas in traditional transactions the involved actors get to know the values of
the respective partner and both parties perhaps build up own shared values during the relation-
ship, in the relatively more anonymous electronic marketplace there is less knowledge about
these values. Consequently, trust will be lower in the electronic environment accounting for the
straightforward effect with respect to the supplier’s inclination towards fraud.
Finally, there are some changes reflecting the supplier’s opportunities for opportunism as
well. In this case, S’s increased possibilities of discovering profitable opportunities for fraud
may have the highest impact on the actual level of opportunism in electronic marketplaces.
This is due to the novelty of this method to conduct transactions, thus leading to a larger room
for applying alertness compared to traditional relationships. In other words: As alertness is the
factor breeding innovations, the talent to find profitable options for fraud can be applied more
successfully in circumstances that are new. In the final section, based on the determinants of
opportunistic behavior some measures to reduce the amount of fraud in Internet transactions
are discussed.
5. Management Implications and Concluding Remarks
Whereas many researchers claim that auctions lower procurement prices and harm long-term
relationships at the same time (Jap 2002), Daly and Nath (2005) discuss measures to make auc-
tions more relationship-friendly. They suggest subsidies for investments in a long-term rela-Michael Welling et al.   401
tionship, price negotiations after an auction, and payments to the losing bidders. Furthermore,
auction platforms might be used to improve collaboration processes. Yet, once the relationship
between suppliers and retailers becomes closer and more valuable, the achievable reductions in
selling prices on the Internet tend to decline. It depends on the retailer’s purpose whether this is
acceptable. If retailers contract their suppliers on the Internet in order to improve the procure-
ment processes and enhance the collaboration with their suppliers, the described measures
seem sufficient. However, if a retailer follows the strategy to become the price leader in a
respective market, the purchasing prices are the only decision criterion in the procurement pro-
cess. Yet, this strategy entails the risk of opening Pandora’s Box. This is why we look for mea-
sures that are able to reduce opportunistic behavior in single transactions instead of
implementing a win-win relationship on the Internet. But it will become obvious that these
measures are limited. First of all, auction platforms operate as trusted third parties aiming at
preempting fraud transactions. They try to prevent participants from publishing fake bids and
monitor that the winner of an auction really receives the respective contract. Despite, suppliers
often assume that retailers use online auctions in opportunistic ways (Jap 2002). Second, in
order to prevent identity changes and to ensure that a supplier is able to match the required
product quality, some retailers certify their suppliers in advance. In certain auctions only those
suppliers already certified can participate. Such certifications will lower the optimal amount of
fraud but also increase transaction costs. Third, the legal uncertainty increases the degree of
opportunism. Therefore, retailers should specify the conditions of an auction as detailed as
possible. They should also avoid changing conditions during or even after an auction to gain
reputation for being a fair transaction partner. Finally, retailers using auction mechanism for
their procurement should implement methods for controlling their buying processes and should
make these transparent to the suppliers in order to nip fraud in the bud.
If retail companies contract suppliers via auctions on the Internet focusing only on reductions
of product prices, this is likely to open Pandora’s Box. Due to the described circumstances sup-
pliers will act selfishly and opportunistic behavior will occur. Measures against such conduct
are limited. In contrast, if retail companies contract suppliers via electronic markets in order to
improve collaboration and if the results are in favor of both parties curtailing the occurrence of
fraud transactions on electronic marketplaces becomes much easier.
6.   Literature
AC Nielsen, (2005). The Power of Private Label 2005 - A Review of Growth Trends around
the World. Internet: http://www.acnielsen.de/pubs/documents/
ThePowerofPrivateLabel2005.pdf [Date: 15.11.2005].
Akerlof, G.A., (1970). The Market for "Lemons" - Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3), pp. 488-500.
Arrow, K.J., (1963). Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. American Eco-
nomic Review 53 (5), pp. 941-973.
Böhme, A., (1999). Die Ausgestaltung von Abnehmer-Zulieferer-Beziehungen - Eine theoreti-
sche und empirische Untersuchung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Opportunis-
musneigung des Abnehmers. Lohmar, Eul.402   Pandora’s Box: Does Electronic Commerce Increase the Optimal Amount of Fraud?
Daly, S.P., Nath, P., (2005). Reverse Auctions for Relationship Marketers. Industrial Marketing
Management 34 (2), pp. 157-166.
Darby, M.R., Karni, E., (1973). Free Competition and the Optimal amount of Fraud. Journal of
Law and Economics 16 (1), pp. 67-88.
Ghoshal, S., Moran, P., (1996). Bad for Practice - A Critique of the Transaction Cost Theory.
Academy of Management Review 21 (1), pp. 13-47.
Graefe, G., (2003). Incredible Information on the Internet - Biased Information Provision and a
Lack of Credibility as a Cause of Insufficient Information Quality. Eppler, M.J., Helfert,
M. (Eds.). Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Information Quality at
MIT, pp. 133-146.
Granovetter, M., (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure - The Problem of Embedded-
ness. American Journal of Sociology 91 (3), pp. 481-510.
Jap, S.D., (2002). Online Reverse Auctions - Issues, Themes, and Prospects for the Future.
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 30 (4), pp. 506-525.
Kirzner, I.M., (1978). Wettbewerb und Unternehmertum. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck.
Klein, B., Leffler, K.B., (1981). The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Perfor-
mance. Journal of Political Economy 89 (4), pp. 615-641.
Nelson, P., (1970). Information and Consumer Behavior. Journal of Political Economy 78 (2),
pp. 311-329.
Nooteboom, B., (1996). Trust, Opportunism and Governance - A Process and Control Model.
Organization Studies 17 (6), pp. 985-1010.
Nooteboom, B., Berger, H., Noorderhaven, N.G., (1997). Effects of Trust and Governance on
Relational Risk. Academy of Management Journal 40 (2), pp. 308-338.
Shapiro, C., (1983a). Optimal Pricing of Experience Goods. Bell Journal of Economics 14 (2),
pp. 497-507.
Shapiro, C., (1983b). Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 97 (4), pp. 659-679.
Stigler, G.J., (1961). The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy 69 (3), pp.
213-225.
Welling, M., (2006). Ökonomik der Marke - Ein Beitrag zum Theorienpluralismus in der Mar-
kenforschung. Wiesbaden, Gabler.
Williamson, O.E., (1983). Credible Commitments - Using Hostages to Support Exchange.
American Economic Review 73 (4), pp. 519-540.
Williamson, O.E., (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism - Firms, Markets, Rela-
tional Contracting. New York, The Free Press.